In light of the weakness of central governments in the Middle East, various armed groups control large parts of the countries. These groups have different beliefs and come from different backgrounds, but what they have in common is their ability to mobilize a variety of resources to maintain their control. One of the most important and most profitable of these methods for them is the kidnapping of foreigners. Nasser Al-Wuhayshi, a former leader of Yemen-based Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, called kidnappings “an easy spoil … a profitable trade and a precious treasure” (Rhode, 2014). Between 2008 and 2014, Al-Qaida and its direct associates generated at least US$125 million in kidnapping revenue, of which US$66 million was collected in 2013 (Callimachi, 2014). This was before kidnapping became a source of terrorist financing. Kidnapping started in Yemen in the early 1990s by tribal groups who had development demands unheard of by the central government. They used the kidnapping to alert the central government to their demands. As a result, many cases of kidnappings in exchange for development projects such as providing water, electricity or roads have been resolved.
The situation developed a few years later at a time when I entered into direct negotiations with the South African hostage-kidnappers in Yemen. It was strange to see- ideological groups legitimizing their actions. The good thing about this is that you can save a lot of time and effort by negotiating with an armed group with clear financial demands to understand their motives and demands. After giving them my life as a guarantee, I succeeded in freeing South African hostage Yolande Korkie without paying ransom. After that, in October 2014, I arranged a meeting between the South African Ambassador to Yemen and the then president of Yemen, Hadi.
After the meeting, the president ordered the head of national security to release one of the leaders of Al-Qaeda in exchange for the now-released husband of the South African’s hostage who remained in captivity, Pierre Korkie. After the meeting, I received a call from the head of national security. He told me what happened between the President and the Ambassador. He confirmed that he would not implement the President’s directive immediately and had instead opted to postpone the order until I had negotiated an agreement to release the South African hostage. This was the same approach I used to free Yolande Korkie without paying ransom. This is the first time I am disclosing this information.
A few months later we reached an agreement to release Piere Korkie, but Mr. Obama, the President of the United States, disagreed when he ordered seal team six to attack and forcibly release other hostages. Unfortunately, the South African hostages were in the same place. The kidnappers killed the hostages, and then the seal team six killed more than 17 people in that place. There were no survivors.
There is a big difference between using force and using negotiations to mediate difficult crisis situations. The chosen method and the approach will ultimately lead to different results.
The one constant in this matter is that mediation and negotiation efforts with armed groups remains a serious problem because they are gelatinous and pragmatic groups, contrary to what we know and understand about groups based on specific ideological positions.
In the last few years, Al-Qaeda has weakened significantly. The weakening of Al-Qaeda has created a gap for other armed and ideological groups to take control of weakened states. Stronger groups have emerged and taken control of countries and made central governments their workers, for instance, the manner in which Hezbollah operates in Lebanon and the popular mobilization forces in Iraq. As for the Houthi group in Yemen, they literally swallowed up the state and took full and complete control of Yemen’s capabilities. A common ideological stance of all these groups is identification with and support from Iran (Solomon, 2017). They also share the idea of divine selection and racial supremacy as these groups believe their blood line is connected to Prophet Muhammad and they have the right to rule accordingly. The more power these militias gain, the higher the ceiling of demands and the more difficult negotiations with them become.
According to the Financial Times, in June 2017 Qatar paid up to US$1bn to free members of its royal family kidnapped during a hunting trip in Iraq . It is clear that this amount is more than what Al-Qaeda has been trying to collect for many years. In Yemen, President Biden has promised that if he wins the elections, he will end the war in Yemen. After winning the presidency, he appointed special envoy Tim Lenderking to Yemen.
Ahead of President Biden’s visit to the Gulf this month, a truce was announced between the Arab coalition and legitimate government on the one hand and the Houthi groups on the other hand. Under this truce, Sana’a airport was opened to commercial flights and large shipments of oil were brought to the Houthi group for halting their attacks on Yemen cities. Ironically, the Houthi made no concessions to the coalition and legitimate government. The truce is nearing its end, and the Al-Houthi are waiting to reap more gains without offering anything in return.
America’s allies in the region are frustrated. Biden’s visit did not achieve anything tangible. After the visit, the UAE announced the reopening of its embassy in Tehran, stating that a diplomatic solution was the only suitable and pragmatic approach in dealing with Iran. Meanwhile, the Houthi group is mobilizing its forces to control more cities, indicating the failure of the negotiating process. The Gulf States are in direct confrontation with ideological militias who are encircling them from several directions, awaiting a signal from Iran for zero hour. The point here is to open a direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia, as it is the largest Gulf state that is still resisting Iranian pressure. Aware of Iran’s mandate, Saudi Arabia has formed alliances with countries such as Turkey and Egypt in the region and internationally with countries such as China and Russiaand to counter this aggression.
The question in this context is, “Is there still any room for negotiations with armed groups when they have become this powerful?” If so, what are the necessary tools, the pressure to negotiate that is justified and the incentives to deal with that, with that we can create a diplomatic movement that will stop the war drums in other Middle Eastern countries?
Anas A. Alhamati
Alhamati is a project manager in the humanitarian field. He holds an MBA in business administration from the University of Reading, UK. With a specialty in “Organizational Leadership in Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous (VUCA) Business Environment”. Currently he is an MA candidate at the International Christian University – Japan. His research is about the “stability and development accelerations strategies in fragile states” (A case study of the Yemen conflict and pathways to peace and development). Before devoting his full-time to humanitarian work, Anas served as CEO of Ebhar for advertising and advertising and before that as head of commercial at the Yemen news agency “SABA”.
References:
Callimachi, R. (2014). Paying ransoms, Europe bankrolls Qaeda terror. The New York Times, 29.
Kazmir, S. (2015). The Law, Policy, and Practice of Kidnapping for Ransom in a Terrorism Context. NYUJ Int’l L. & Pol., 48, 325.
Kam, E. (2006). The Ayatollah, Hizbollah, and Hassan Nasrallah. Strategic Assessment, 9(2), 10-11.
Solomon, E. (2017). The $1 bn hostage deal that enraged Qatar’s Gulf rivals’. Financial Times, 5.
International Christian University Rotary Peace Center 
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